In the next in our series of blogs exploring Legislative Council Reform, we're looking at indirect election.
TL;DR:
An appointed LegCo would be an amended version of our current system, through which members of the public would not have a direct say on MLCs.
The role of Legislative Council in this system may stay the same however some recommendations suggest a limit be placed on their powers.
A possible way that this would be done would be through the creation of a Nominations Commission, which would recommend candidates to the House of Keys to be voted on by MHKs.
An alternative may see the Chief Minister / Opposition MHKs make suggestions on the appointment to the Governor.
Supporters of this system see it more transparent than our current model, with the potential to increase diversity of Tynwald, ensure good quality candidates, maintain the relationship between Keys and LegCo, ensure that groups from across Manx society are represented and prevent the revolving door of MHKs becoming MLCs.
Opponents see this system as lacking direct democratic legitimacy, open to manipulation by government and favouring experienced candidates.
Examples of where versions of this are used include Canada, Bermuda, Jamaica, Belize, Ireland and the Bahamas.
Whilst it could be argued to be simply a version of our system with extra steps, an externally proposed and indirectly elected LegCo is often suggested as an ‘unhappy middle ground’ for reform.
Historically an appointed upper chamber was not uncommon, with the most obvious being the British House of Lords.
Historically an appointed upper chamber was not uncommon, with the most obvious being the British House of Lords. Whilst the prevailing winds seem to be against appointed chambers there is a number which still serve as a ‘sober second thought’ within the legislative process.
Much of the former British colonial Caribbean has appointed upper houses chambers, a slightly evolved legacy of the exportation of the Westminster system. In these countries, which generally have party political politics, Senators are often appointed by the Governor on the advice of both the Prime Minister or the Leader of the Opposition. Some, such as Grenada have a certain allocation of seats for specific industries (farming, fishing and trade unions). Others allow the Governor to appoint members on their own recommendation, with these Senators often sitting as independents.
As with most evolved Westminster systems, the power of these Senates is often limited, with restrictions placed on the policies they can have input into and in many cases they can be overruled by the other chamber. This is not universal however, the Bermudan Senate for example, plays an important role in constitutional change, requiring the support of both parties in order for it to pass the chamber.
Often highlighted when discussions of LegCo reform are on the table is the Seanad Eireann or the Irish Senate, a highly confusing mishmash of different appointment methods. The 60-member chamber is filled by a combination of appointees by the Taoiseach, university graduates and industry experts from the fields of business, industry, culture and the voluntary sector appointed by vocational panels. There have been numerous failed attempts to reform the Seanad, most notably the 2013 referendum. Critics cite a lack of cost, the unfair weighting of select graduate votes and the in-built government majority.
Despite this, some Manx politicians and commentators have periodically chosen to cherry-pick aspects of the Seanad, most notably the seats allocated to industry experts and the 3rd sector as a possible basis for Council Membership. Their argument is that this would create a chamber which, whilst less political, would better represent the Manx business and communities across the Island, providing voices to marginalised and minority voices whilst also ensuring that industry has a direct link to the chamber. Again, the practicalities of how this would be done are vague and potentially selective electorates are not a widely utilised or particularly popular method of installing national politicians globally.
A version of this system is suggested in Lisvane’s 2016 report, which set out the creation of a Nominations Commission as his preferred option for the Legislative Council.
A version of this system is suggested in Lisvane’s 2016 report, which set out the creation of a Nominations Commission as his preferred option for the Legislative Council. This group would be tasked with publicising the opportunity of membership; encouraging good candidates to come forward and proposing candidates to the House of Keys Made up of (in Lisvane’s words) ‘probably’, five members of some standing and authority from the Island and abroad, with a focus placed on emphasising diversity.
Anyone (aside from sitting MHKs) could apply to the Commission when vacancies arose, however, effort would be placed on engaging different sectors and identifying a diverse range of candidates. Potential nominees would be interviewed based on the job description created by the Nominations Commission and successful nominees would be recommended to the Keys in the order which Commission considered them suitable for the role. The candidates would then fill the vacancies based on their votes in a single round of voting. This system would rely on a level of understanding between the public and MHKs that they have been granted a mandate through the public election to appoint MLCs on their behalf (in line with the delegate model of representation) and similar, though not fully equivalent to appointments made by the Senate in the US.
Lisvane’s broader recommendations for an indirectly elected Council suggest that in addition to a new appointment system that its powers should also change, with it being restricted from voting on issues of ‘taxation or appropriation’ - which Lisvane states should be the privilege of the Keys. Noted by Brooks, most radically, also argued that MLCs should not sit as Ministers or Departmental members due to their primary role being scrutiny. Possibly least radically, Lisvane also saw a retained role for the Bishop as a full voting member but suggested that on issues on which he has no option that he may be allowed to abstain.
The ‘LisCo’ is an interesting exercise, which if implemented fully may allow for a slightly more representative (but no more democratic) Council, with a focus purely placed on security. However, issues of self-selection of candidates, democratic legitimacy, possible industry infighting over the selection of candidates, concerns about ‘equality/diversity’ candidates, a possible reduced mandate from single round voting and the retention of the Bishop, led many to see these proposals simply fiddling at the margins of what is widely considered to be a broken system.
An appointments commission, as said mentioned at the start of this section, whilst an ‘unhappy middle ground’ is a likely avenue for change. It serves compromise which can be both performative in scope and limited in resource requirements. Whilst may allow for a continuation of the collaborative relationship between Keys and LegCo and, if implemented properly may lead to a more representative revising chamber, it fails to address a core focus of a huge amount of discourse around this issue and may not be sufficient for the Manx public at large.
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