In the next in our series of blogs exploring Legislative Council Reform, we're looking at direct election, the often spouted solution to a big issue many people have with LegCo.
Direct Election would see Legislative Council become a publicly elected chamber responsible for scrutiny.
This could be done in a number of ways with MLCs likely being elected on a sheading or all-island basis.
This system is often used by larger countries to provide equal representation to regions, states and groups.
Supporters of this argue that it would provide a democratic mandate for LegCo through public elections and ensure that only people elected would have input into bills.
Opponents argue that it would change the balance of power between Keys and Legislative Council and lead to the possibility of LegCo having stronger support from the public than the Keys, that it may create blockages in the legislative process, would be costly, may not attract diverse candidates suited to legislative scrutiny.
Examples of where this is used includes; Australia (State and Federal), the USA and Switzerland.
‘Direct Election’ is what most people think of when they talk about LegCo reform. The current method of indirect election is generally considered to be the major, but not only, sticking point for the public and is often wheeled out by detractors of LegCo as the big issue, citing a lack of democratic accountability.
Directly elected second chambers exist both at a national and sub-state level around the world.
Details of the proposed role and form of directly elected LegCo would have are vague, however, evidence collected through the Lisvane Report, indicated that then-current thinking was that responsibilities would remain the same as they are now, with a comparable number of elected members.
At present, most people consider the Keys to be the dominant house. It has the ability to force through legislation without the consent of LegCo, it originates bills, votes on the Chief Minister and decides the composition of the Legislative Council itself. Many would argue that this superiority is born out of the democratic mandate that the Keys hold through public elections.
Supporters of a directly elected house often argue for the introduction of a proportional-based system, either formed around an all-Island vote or larger constituencies or sheadings.
Supporters of a directly elected house often argue for the introduction of a proportional-based system, either formed around an all-Island vote or larger constituencies or sheadings. Whether it be an increased mandate from larger constituencies or the use of an electoral system which is more reflective of public sentiment, you could easily make the argument that a directly elected LegCo would have greater democratic legitimacy than an unreformed Keys. If that were to be the case why should LegCo be constrained by Keys? It is not unreasonable however to imagine a scenario where a directly elected Legislative Council, with an all-island mandate, could possibly serve as the Government, with the responsibilities flipped and the Keys relegated to a role primarily based around local representation and scrutiny.
With the introduction of public mandate the roles of Legislative Council and Keys become more blurred. Both perform scrutiny functions, pass legislation, sit on committees and public boards, can be departmental members or Ministers and engage with the public.
David Ashford in the 2021 manifesto discounts this line of argument stating that ‘they would be popularly elected to do two different roles’. However, with the introduction of public mandate the roles of Legislative Council and Keys become more blurred. Both perform scrutiny functions, pass legislation, sit on committees and public boards, can be departmental members or Ministers and engage with the public - it is hard to see, without some kind of reform what the differences in the roles would be. In evidence given to Lisvane Review, it is clear that some members believe that this system would create immediate conflict and that nothing less than parity of powers between Keys and LegCo would be acceptable.
This situation does have precedents though, Australia for example at both a state and federal level operates a directly elected legislative council system. In most cases, both chambers use a form of PR, with the Senate and LegCo’s representing states and regions. Important to note in a Manx context that Senators and Councillors can and do serve as Ministers and if a similar system were to be introduced in the Isle of Man it is possible that this could allow for a larger number prospective Ministerial candidates, it is unknown how Ministers in the upper chamber may impact Legisltive Council business or if their diaries may limit their ability to discharge their scrutiny role.
It is important to note that both the Australian Senate and the State Legislative Councils are much stronger than many other second chambers, with powers to block legislation, with those potential blockages leading to a dissolution of parliament.
‘Ease of passing government business’ is not the sole metric when passing judgement on the effectiveness of a parliament.
Despite what some may think, ‘ease of passing government business’ is not the sole metric when passing judgement on the effectiveness of a parliament however, clearly weight has been given to it as a factor by Lisvane and contributors to his report.
There is also the argument that an elected system would cause issues for both the type of candidates coming forward and promote MLCs taking short-term, electorally successful positions, rather than long-term strategic decisions.
Regarding the type of candidates. An issue of electoral politics is selection bias. Certain people are attracted to putting themselves forward as candidates and not everyone is comfortable or able to run an election campaign. First-time candidates and those who may not come from a ‘political’ background may bring a unique voice to the scrutiny debate but may find themselves disadvantaged when competing against seasoned campaigners and we may end up with two chambers filled with similar people performing similar roles.
Related to this is the cost of a democratic mandate. There is an argument that the indirect election systems allow for a more considered approach to be taken to policy making, allowing MLCs to ask questions and take positions which may not be politically popular in the short term. This may be lost if the second chamber becomes elected even if certain mitigations are taken (longer terms, term limits, PR). However, one could argue that the preset system too has flaws.
At present, MLCs are primarily accountable to MHKs, as they are the ones who elect them and it is very easy to see how a ‘challenging’ MLC may lose the support of the Keys come election time.
Whilst it is likely that a directly elected LegCo would upset the present balance between the Houses of Tynwald, ‘ease of passing government business’ is not the sole metric when passing judgement on the effectiveness of a parliament.
Much like unicameralism, public elections are one possible solution to many of the problems which sit high on the public’s list of issues with LegCo, delivering democratic accountability without completely tearing up the ‘tricameral’ nature of our Parliament. However, the potential implications of a Council with a strong public mandate risks shifting the balance of power in Tynwald and creating a number of unexpected consequences and potential sticking points which must be addressed.
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